VZCZCXRO4320
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0943 3351728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5516
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0102
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0087
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6066

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY 
(KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON). 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC PARM PINR RS KGIC KNNP KRAD ENRG
LY 
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS 

REF: A) TRIPOLI 938, B) TRIPOLI 941 

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. 
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-equivalent 
XXXXXXXXXXXX December 1 to convey our serious 
concerns about the security of the seven HEU-filled casks 
at the Tajoura  Nuclear Facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX 
dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there 
was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do 
anything with the casks and that the chances of anything 
happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as 
evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief 
underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the 
situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura 
was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had 
recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if 
possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane 
inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks 
were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too 
dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks 
unprotected. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he would meet with Foreign 
Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns. 

¶2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental 
disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to 
Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision 
from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it 
would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized 
Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits, 
and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled 
stops. XXXXXXXXXXXX was not aware of how complicated
 it would be to schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood 
that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he 
agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few 
weeks. 

¶3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have 
prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of 
the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment 
back. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime 
Mininster-equivalent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but 
did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (XXXXXXXXXXXX may well 
have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa 
on this issue.) XXXXXXXXXXXX promised to call us after he had briefed 
Kusa. 

¶4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam 
al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same 
information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials 
understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the 
halted shipment. 

POLASCHIK