VZCZCXRO1764
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3091/01 3002216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 272216Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8776
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0434
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

231666
2009-10-27 22:16:00
09MEXICO3091
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCXRO1764
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3091/01 3002216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 272216Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8776
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0434
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 MEXICO 003091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO CITY FRAUD SUMMARY FOR MARCH - AUGUST 2009 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Mexico City's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) was 
substantially reorganized this reporting period.  In August the new 
Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) assumed responsibility for 
coordinating fraud prevention programs throughout Mexico, and the 
deputy FPM took primary responsibility for managing the Mexico City 
unit.  Staff efforts during the reporting period focused on new 
training programs for NIV and ACS line officers, attacking H2 visa 
fraud, and developing new procedural standards for anti-fraud 
activities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MEXICO CITY FRAUD CONDITIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  The Mexico City Consular District includes the states of 
Chiapas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacn, Morelos, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Queretaro, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, the 
State of Mexico and the Federal District.  The Mexico City 
metropolitan area is one of the largest population centers in the 
world and includes almost 20 percent of the total Mexican 
population. The city faces chronic problems of inadequate and 
unsanitary water, unreliable electricity, and traffic jams.  The 
Mexico City consular district has one of the largest U.S. citizen 
expatriate populations in the world. Approximately 10,000 Americans 
are registered with the Embassy, but estimates of the total number 
of citizens in the district at any time range from 300,000 to 1.5 
million, including dual nationals.  With one of the largest city 
economies in the world, Mexico City is also home to many third 
country nationals (TCNs) who come here to work, study, and live 
permanently in Mexico. 
 
¶3.  Mexico City is a medium to high fraud post, and overall numbers 
of visa and passport applicants produce a large absolute number of 
fraud-related cases. Mexico's proximity to the U.S. and 
deteriorating security and economic conditions here make travel and 
migration to the U.S., legal and otherwise, attractive.  The 
longstanding problems that economic migration has produced on both 
sides of the border are well known. In recent years, however, 
drug-related violence increased dramatically as cartels sought to 
consolidate their territories along the border and extend them into 
the U.S.  Consequently, growing numbers of wealthy Mexicans seek to 
avoid threats to personal security by "investing" their way to 
long-term or permanent residence in the U.S. Organized crime and 
drug trafficking rings also have links to increased production of 
counterfeit documents and instances of stolen or "borrowed" 
identity. 
 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶4.  Mexico City has one of the three largest non-immigrant visa 
(NIV) units in the world, processing between 1,500 and 2,000 visa 
applications daily.  The vast majority are from Mexican nationals, 
but a significant number are from third-country nationals (TCN) who 
reside in Mexico, as well as some who reside in the U.S. and wish to 
renew employment visas without having to travel to their home 
countries. 
 
¶5.  Statistical rates of visa issuance and associated fraud have 
remained relatively constant for the last three reporting periods. 
In most visa classes less than one percent of applications were 
referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) or recorded as involving 
suspicious documents.  P (performer), H (employment) and L 
(intra-company transferee) visas had the highest rate of fraud 
referrals or suspect documents, but these still reflect no more than 
one or two per cent of applications.  In absolute numbers, the 
overwhelming majority of cases requiring FPU involvement were for 
BBBCV visas: 
 
                 Mar09-Aug09     Sep08-Feb09      Mar08-Sep08 
 
 FPU cases*          642              528             749 
 % BBBCV**           71%              85%             89% 
 
* Reflects the total of pending fraud investigations and resolved 
cases with fraud confirmed or not confirmed. Statistics also include 
applications accompanied by suspicious documents that may or not 
have been formally referred. Hence, there is overlap with some of 
the fraud confirmed/not confirmed cases. FPU also handled 1,722 
minor NIV inquiries from officers on the visa line. 
**Percent of total FPU cases. 
 
¶6.  The decreased percentage of fraud-related BBBCV cases during 
this reporting period probably reflects a relative increase in the 
number of H2B referrals (see paragraphs 16).  Of all cases formally 
referred to FPU, fraud was confirmed in 34% during this period, 
compared with 44% between Sep08 - Feb09 and 35% between Mar08 - 
Sep08.  A goal for this reporting period is to provide additional 
training for adjudicators so that they can better distinguish cases 
 
MEXICO 00003091  002 OF 007 
 
 
that should be formally referred.  This should have the 
complementary effect of increasing the yield of cases in which fraud 
is confirmed. 
 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE MEXICO CITY FPU 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶7. Mexico City's current FPU staffing includes an FS-01 FPM, an 
FS-04 deputy, a consular associate, one LES-10 consular 
assistant/investigator, five FSN-09 LES investigators and one FSN-6 
consular clerk. Two FSN investigator positions are now vacant but 
will be filled before the end of 2009. 
American Staff 
-------------- 
¶8. With the arrival of a more senior FPM, his role has been expanded 
to include regional responsibility for fraud prevention 
coordination.  (Post will report separately on the development of a 
regional approach and the effect it will have on Mexico FPU 
operations.) Concurrently, the deputy FPM assumed primary 
responsibility for daily management of Mexico City's FPU.  In 
addition to supervising individual investigations and developing the 
unit's growing list of training and outreach opportunities, she has 
taken on primary responsibility for organizational, procedural and 
personnel decisions within the unit and relates directly with FPMs 
at other posts as an operational peer. 
¶9. Similarly, the unit's consular associate now has additional 
responsibilities in the reorganized unit. These include direct 
involvement in supervising certain kinds of investigations, e.g. 
those dealing with verifying of records and establishing 
relationships. She also increased her responsibility for project 
management, such as developing a Mexico fraud prevention blog and 
devising mechanisms for sharing local fraud prevention databases 
among U.S. missions in Mexico. 
The Role of LES 
--------------- 
¶10. Locally engaged FPU staffing is adequate and appropriately 
allocated. Given the growing importance of H&L visa fraud issues, 
however, mission Mexico and the Department might consider creating a 
senior country-wide FSN H&L investigator position parallel to that 
of the Regional Fraud Prevention Manager. 
¶11. LES in the FPU have two primary roles. The first, and arguably 
most important, is education. At least one investigator is present 
in the NIV section throughout the day. Investigators answer brief 
questions from officers involving local knowledge, e.g. Mexican 
employment practices, availability and security of civil documents, 
or banking practices. Officers are generally discouraged from 
relying on documents, but investigators may provide spot evaluations 
of critical items such as civil records that are important to 
proving relationships. Finally, investigators are a continuous 
resource for building understanding of Mexican culture, including 
social mores and taboos, family relationships, government ethics, 
etc. 
 
¶12.  FPU staff provided 294 hours of training in the last six 
months, more than double the previous period.  Audiences included 
FSOs, LES and outside agencies and businesses.  The FPU "fraud tour" 
of Mexico City is a popular activity both for consular officers and 
others within the mission.  FPU staff provided the following 
locally-developed training activities during the reporting period: 
 
(A) Fraud briefing for new consular officers and 3 month update; 
 
(B) Seminar for NIV officers on the Mexican education system; 
 
(C) Seminar for NIV officers on the Mexican tax system; 
 
(D) NIV officer seminar on social and economic aspects of Mexico 
City; 
 
(E) NIV officer seminar on social and economic aspects and migration 
patterns in the Mexico City consular district; 
 
(F)  Airport training in Mexico City, Queretaro, Michoacan, Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Tabasco and Guerrero on Mexican identity documents, US visas 
and passports, passenger evaluation and impostor detection. 
 
(G) Training for Mexican and multinational financial institutions 
(banks, American Express) on Mexican identity documents. 
 
(H) Seminar on Mexican identity documents for ACS staff. 
 
Additional seminars in the development stage include the Mexican 
judiciary system and social security and employment. 
 
¶13.  We are convinced that the more training and context FPU 
provides for adjudicators the better decisions they will make.  For 
example, after a recent fraud tour officers reported interviews with 
previously refused candidates who were owners of outdoor stands in 
the "Central de Abastos."  The refusal notes indicated that officers 
 
MEXICO 00003091  003 OF 007 
 
 
conducting the original interviews believed that applicants owned 
small roadside fruit or vegetable stands.  During the fraud tour, 
however, officers learned that the Central de Abastos is the largest 
wholesale food market in all of Latin America.  Families owning 
stands there face significant security risks because criminal gangs 
in the area are aware that owners leave the market every evening 
with large amounts of legitimately earned cash.  These applicants, 
whose ties are clearly very strong, have been issued visas. 
¶14. The LES staff's other major role is case investigation. When a 
case is referred by a line officer it normally remains FPU's 
responsibility until the investigation is completed.  The goal for 
FPU investigators is to obtain sufficient reliable information for 
an adjudicating officer to make an informed judgment.  FPU 
investigators make their findings a part of the permanent electronic 
record. In some cases an officer may independently obtain sufficient 
information before an investigation is complete to make a decision. 
When this happens the officer may request that the case be returned 
for immediate adjudication. 
Standards for Formal FPU Referrals 
---------------------------------- 
¶15. Officers are encouraged to refer cases to FPU under limited 
circumstances.  The most important include: (1) when fraud 
indicators suggest possible U.S. citizen involvement, especially 
cases of suspected fraud involving American lawyers; (2) when there 
is an existing or potential U.S. or Mexican law enforcement 
interest; (3) when the suspected fraud is connected to groups of 
applicants (e.g., entertainers) and investigation may reveal 
wrongdoing on the part of petitioners or disqualification of groups; 
and (4) suspected employment visa fraud.  Formal referrals in visa 
categories subject to Section 214(b) of the INA should be justified 
by unusual circumstances. Cases involving high profile applicants or 
official inquiries are possible examples. 
Investigations Not Involving Officer Referrals 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶16. The FPU routinely pre-screens some categories of visa 
applications, and findings will sometimes result in an investigation 
at FPU's own initiative. H2 and P visa cases frequently fall into 
this category, as do occasional groups of BBBCV or B1/B2 applicants. 
 Individual H1 applications involving a common petitioner may 
qualify as well.  Typical screening includes PIMS checks for adverse 
field memos, Lexis/Nexis verification of employer bona fides, and 
checking H2B employers against a watch list maintained by the 
consulate in Monterrey.  FPU also conducts text searches in the 
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to determine whether a 
petitioner has filed petitions at other posts.  A summary of vetting 
results is sent to H2B adjudicating officers prior to the applicant 
interview date.  If adverse information is sufficiently strong, FPU 
will complete its investigation of a petitioner/recruiter before 
interviews proceed (see paragraphs 18-22). 
H2 Visas 
-------- 
 
¶17.  H visas, and especially H2Bs, have emerged as a leading NIV 
category for fraud investigation and confirmed fraud in Mexico City. 
 Traditionally, FPU efforts to combat H2B fraud have been directed 
at all three principal actors - petitioners, recruiters and workers. 
There appears to be no objective evidence, however, that devoting 
significant resources to proving individual immigration violations 
by workers produces proportionately effective results.  A major goal 
for the next reporting period is open a dialogue on this subject 
between FPMs at consulates in Mexico, FPP and perhaps other U.S. 
immigration agencies to devise a strategy with regard to individual 
violations that is effective while making the most efficient use of 
FPU resources. 
 
¶18. A recent investigation of an H2B petition for horse racing 
grooms illustrates some of the issues involved and strategic options 
to consider.  Horse racing is a highly seasonal and unpredictable 
profession. Victory or loss in a race may quickly shift a stable's 
focus from one horse or location to another.  It is relatively easy 
to document through applicant interviews that H2B grooms frequently 
work sequentially for different owners and or in different 
locations.  Both are illegal under H2B guidelines.  Some petitioners 
deal with the problem by misrepresenting the duration or location of 
a job on petitions; in other cases individual owners hire 
undocumented workers.  A recent twist involves a recruiting company 
that allegedly attempted to solve the horse owners' problem by 
acting as the employer of record for nearly 300 grooms who would be 
farmed out to members of a horsemen's association at a race track in 
New Jersey. In theory, this arrangement would have permitted the 
employer of record (i.e., the recruiting company) to provide steady 
employment for grooms, albeit in a shifting set of stables.  It 
appears that the horsemen's association, in a genuine attempt to be 
helpful to its members, allowed its name to be used by the recruiter 
who promised to provide "legal" labor.  The association, however, 
never made any effort to ensure that the recruiter did things 
legally. 
 
 
MEXICO 00003091  004 OF 007 
 
 
¶19.  Information collected from applicants is sometimes key to 
discerning illegal activity by petitioners.  For this reason, FPU 
has often waited until the day scheduled for interviews to resolve 
questions about petitions.  In this case, however, FPU and the NIV 
Chief made a strategic decision not to devote investigator and 
adjudicator resources to debrief and interview almost 300 applicants 
until or unless problems with the petition, some of which involved 
complex and shifting legal issues, were resolved.  A threshold 
issue, for example, was whether a recruiting company could legally 
act as the intermediary between workers and association members. 
After considerable research we learned that the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) had in the past accepted 
petitions from "agents" of membership organizations, and the 
horsemen's petition had been grandfathered under this procedure. 
CIS had recently discontinued this type of agent petition, however, 
because of precisely the types of abuses we suspected. 
 
¶20.    Waiting to conduct the interviews turned out to be a 
practical decision.  Armed with legal research, FPU asked the 
petitioner's representative for a list of the horse owners and 
trainers where grooms would be placed.  The recruiter, however, 
could provide only a list of the horsemen's association membership. 
Telephone checks with members divulged that no specific arrangements 
had been made between the petitioner and horse owners for job 
placements, and that the membership could not have absorbed anywhere 
near 300 workers. 
 
¶21. Partially as a result of this experience the FPU unit now uses 
the prescreening process as a "red light/green light" for scheduling 
applicants for interviews.  Legal issues related to the petition 
receive initial priority, and until those are resolved nothing goes 
forward.  This not only preserves scarce NIV resources, but keeps 
relatively poor H2B applicants from having to pay application fees 
and the costs related to travel to Mexico City.  We hope to refine 
and develop additional strategies in coming months to further 
streamline our work. 
 
H2 Training and Outreach 
------------------------ 
 
¶22.  FPU is involved in outreach initiatives to educate the Mexican 
public about the H2 program, debunk myths and protect workers' 
rights.  During the reporting period FPU staff traveled to the 
states of Chiapas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, 
Tabasco and Tlaxcala to establish contact with local offices of the 
Mexican Immigration Secretariat and conduct workshops on migration 
issues.  The FPU H visa investigator returned to Hidalgo with an 
adjudicating officer for a one-hour interview on a popular radio 
program that generated a lively call-in question and answer session. 
 FPU hopes to build on these successes with similar programs in the 
next year. 
 
Visa Fraud in Non-H2 Categories 
------------------------------- 
 
¶23.  Although infrequent, fraud in the H1B and L categories is often 
complex and difficult to evaluate.  Some TN visa applicants create 
credentials for scientific technician and "management consultant" 
positions that would be more appropriate for less skilled positions. 
 Groups, applying for P visas or BBBCVs, sometimes include "hangers 
on," added to the group or team as a favor or in return for money. 
Adjudicating officers also indicate that some crew visa applicants 
are so vague about what they are transporting that it raises 
concerns that they have cargos of narcotics. 
 
Learning From Mistakes 
---------------------- 
 
¶24.  FPU is working with NIV officers to develop a database of 
information culled from I-275 "Withdrawals of Application for 
Admission to the U.S."  I-275s are distributed to line officers who 
review them to determine whether ineligibilities should be applied 
based on the information reported by CBP.  They then query INK to 
verify whether ineligibilities have already been applied when the 
I-275 was generated.  If recommended ineligibilities or lookouts are 
confirmed by the NIV manager FPU enters the lookout and scans 
available records into the file.  Relevant information is then added 
to the FPU database which, when populated, should allow us to 
identify trends and share them with adjudicators.  During this 
reporting period, NIV officers and FPU processed 700 I-275s.DV 
FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶25.  Mexico City does not process diversity visas. 
 
ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD 
--------------------------- 
 
 
MEXICO 00003091  005 OF 007 
 
 
¶26.  Mexico City adjudicated approximately 5,000 passports and CRBAs 
during the reporting period.  Refusal rates were approximately four 
per cent for passports nine percent for CRBAs.  Approximately one 
per cent of passport and CRBA were referred to FPU. 
 
¶27.  Within this small sample (46 total investigations) the level of 
confirmed fraud is very low.  A typical example involves minor 
children born in the U.S. to undocumented Mexican laborers.  Such 
children were often sent back to Mexico as infants, frequently 
y 
within days of birth, with no documentation other than a birth 
certificate.  Raised by relatives in Mexico while parents worked in 
the U.S., children acquired everything necessary to live normally in 
Mexican society.  This included late-registered, fraudulent Mexican 
birth certificate previously required for all children to attend 
public schools or obtain other public benefits.  Years or decades 
later when these children attempt to document American citizenship 
they appear to have no meaningful relationship to the U.S. other 
than a naturally-suspect birth certificate.  While time consuming, 
most cases following this pattern fortunately can be resolved with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. 
 
¶28.  Post rarely encounters U.S. birth certificates listing midwives 
instead of doctors as birth attendants.  Mexico City's ACS section 
is working closely with the Passport Office in Washington and other 
ACS chiefs in Mexico to draft adjudication guidelines for such cases 
that comply with the recent Castelano settlement agreement. 
 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶29.  Mexico City does not process adoption cases. 
 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
------------------ 
 
¶30. Almost all DNA testing at post occurs in passport and/or CRBA 
cases when there is doubt about the parent/child relationship.  Post 
estimates that approximately 20% of passport/CRBA applicants who are 
asked to undergo DNA testing abandon their applications.  In most 
cases this is probably because they know that the necessary 
relationship does not exist, but there is some concern that 
applications may be abandoned because the tests are prohibitively 
expensive for poor families. 
 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶31.  The office of the Department of Homeland Security in Mexico 
City handles asylum cases and other claims for DHS benefits. 
 
 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 
---------------------------------- 
¶32.  Alien smuggling and trafficking is a big business in Mexico 
operated by local and transnational criminal organizations able to 
capitalize on the systemic corruption in Mexican immigration 
agencies and civil registries.  FPU works closely with the U.S. 
Office of Foreign Assets Control to revoke visas of drug kingpins 
and their families for whom sufficient evidence exists that they are 
involved in or benefit economically from narcotics trafficking. 
Post also responds to written requests by U.S. law enforcement 
agencies to provide visa record information for use in criminal law 
enforcement investigations. 
LEAHY VETTING 
------------- 
¶33.  The Merida Initiatives have provided thousands of training 
opportunities for Mexican law enforcement officials.  Each trainee, 
however, must be vetted through a number of databases, including 
CLASS.  "Leahy vetting" as it is called has until now been performed 
by consular officers.  As the Merida Initiatives have grown, 
however, Leahy vetting has become a significant workload issue, 
frequently requiring 20+ hours per week for officers to complete. 
These requirements will continue to increase over time.  Continued 
Leahy vetting by consular officers is unsustainable given Mexico 
City's heavy visa workload and the fact that name checks, many of 
which do not involve visa adjudication, serve no consular function. 
The FPM is exploring possible alternatives with the Embassy's Leahy 
vetting coordinator. 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶34.  The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Criminal Investigations 
Program and Visa and Passport Security Program are well established 
in Mexico.   The program currently has seven DS Special Agents 
serving in ARSO-I positions co-located with consular sections in 
Mexico City, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Matamoros, 
Monterrey, and Guadalajara.  Two more ARSO-I positions will be added 
 
MEXICO 00003091  006 OF 007 
 
 
in 2010 in Nogales and Nuevo Laredo.  In addition, Mexico City now 
has a new, permanent Deputy RSO-I for Investigations (DRSO-I) who 
will promote Mexico-wide coordination. 
 
¶35.  When FPU identifies visa cases that appear to involve 
violations of U.S. law or organized criminal activity in Mexico the 
FPM reviews them with the ARSO-I who determines whether to open a 
criminal investigation.  The ARSO-I files monthly investigation 
reports on the status of all criminal visa fraud cases with the 
Diplomatic Security Criminal Investigations Division and shares this 
information with the FPM.  Significant cases, updates, and final 
disposition are also shared in regular meetings with FPP.  Criminal 
cases with only a local nexus are often passed by the ARSO-I's to 
host nation authorities for prosecution. 
 
¶36.  During this reporting period, the ARSO-I office in Mexico City 
was involved in 11 arrest cases.  In addition, the DRSO-I has worked 
closely with Mexican authorities and the U.S. Department of Justice 
to extradite two Mexican national attorneys believed to be involved 
in a trafficking-in-persons case being prosecuted Utah. 
 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶37.  In late 2007 the SRE established an internal passport integrity 
unit.  In February 2008 the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) 
sponsored anti-fraud training for several members of the new unit in 
Washington.  The unit officially began operations in March 2009 
under the direction of a close contact of the Mexico City FPU.  Thus 
far, the unit has operated independently, and has been successful 
implementing reforms and management controls that resulted in 
dismissal of a number of employees.  The unit travels extensively to 
inspect regional passport agencies as well as Mexican consulates in 
the U.S. 
 
¶38. Despite these improvements, Mexican passport security still has 
far to go.  Although the Mexican passport includes effective 
security features, it remains easy to acquire legitimate Mexican 
passports using fraudulent birth certificates.  Mexico City's FPU 
has shared with the Mexican Secretariat of External Relations 
(SRE)information about local passport offices that appear to have a 
history of issuing fraudulently obtained passports.  One of FPU's 
priorities is to work with other USG agencies to support and 
strengthen the SRE passport security initiative. 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶39.  FPU has excellent contacts with civil registrars throughout the 
consular district.  In addition, FPU and the ARSO-I recently began 
to works closely with the Mexican Attorney General's office (PGR) to 
prosecute double identity and other serious fraud cases.  In a 
related effort, FPU investigators meet regularly with Mexican police 
to turn over false "cedulas profesionales," that have been submitted 
in support of visa applications.  In a number of instances FPU has 
determined that applicants had been using the cards to practice 
professions without a license both in Mexico and the U.S. Mexican 
authorities take these cases seriously and information provided by 
the Embassy frequently leads to prosecutions. 
 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER EMBASSY AGENCIES AND AGENCIES IN U.S. 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶40.  FPU receives requests for information or assistance from U.S. 
government agencies at the Embassy and in the U.S. Frequently these 
are requests for copies of Mexican civil documents needed in 
connection with criminal investigations or to establish rights to 
benefits.  FPU also performs INK name checks on behalf of USG 
agencies that sponsor Mexican citizens for training or exchange 
visitor programs, need clearances for new hires or for Embassy 
landlords. 
 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN/INTEREST 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶41.  Only two of Mexico City's authorized six LES investigators have 
taken the FSI fraud prevention course.  With the recent departure of 
two investigators it is essential that two additional investigators 
with three or more years' experience attend this important course. 
Post also hopes to establish a regular schedule of initial and 
follow-up training for all FPU personnel, including FSOs and LES. 
 
¶42.  Ciudad Juarez will be host a countrywide H&L visa fraud 
conference in late January or February 2010.  The conference will 
have a broad scope, but H2 visas will receive particular attention. 
Attendees will likely include the FPM and at least one LES from each 
Mexico post, as well as representatives from the ARSO-I program, 
FPP, KCC and CIS. 
 
MEXICO 00003091  007 OF 007 
 
 
 
 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
---------------------- 
¶43.  Post started this reporting period with an acting FPM, an entry 
level rotational officer, a senior FSN fraud investigator, and 5 FSN 
fraud investigators.  The acting FPM was on leave for several 
months.  In addition, two LES investigators resigned to pursue new 
opportunities near the end of the reporting period.  The new FPM, an 
ELO deputy FPM and consular associate arrived in August at the same 
time as the new DRSO-I who is filling a temporary ARSO-I gap. The 
new ARSO-I is expected to arrive at the end of October.  The 
following is a list of current FPU employees and fraud prevention 
training received by each: 
 
Fraud Prevention Manager:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(PC-542 - July 2009) 
 
Deputy Fraud Prevention Manager:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(On the job training) 
 
Senior FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(Equivalent of PC 542 taken in Fort Lauderdale, FL in 1998) 
 
FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(PC 542 - March 2006) 
 
FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(No formal training) 
 
FSN Fraud Investigator (H and L):  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(No formal training) 
 
FSN Administrative Assistant:  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(No formal training) 
 
FEELEY