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Viewing cable 09CAIRO958, ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POLICIES ON SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO958 2009-05-28 08:08 2011-02-16 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO4547
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0958/01 1480821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280821Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2659
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1303
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0017
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000958 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL SU CD EG
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POLICIES ON SUDAN 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 824 
     ΒΆB. 08 CAIRO 1833 Classified By: Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs Catherine Hill-Herndon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C) Key Points -- The Arab League (AL) was pleased with the visit to Cairo of S/E Gration, and supports the USG position on Sudan. During AL SYG Moussa's recent trip to Sudan he encouraged the Government of Sudan (GOS) to "seize the opportunity" to work with the USG to resolve the situation. -- AL priorities in Darfur are a ceasefire to facilitate peace, reconciliation between the rebel groups, and then between the rebels and the GOS, and implementation of justice. -- The AL considers fighting between Sudan and Chad a "dilemma" and it is willing to work with the USG on a strategy to make the Sudan-Chad agreement, signed in Doha, "viable." -- A Darfur-Darfur dialogue is needed to resolve fighting on the ground. Arab and Fur groups need to be involved since they are the primary players in the intra-Darfur conflict. -- AL supports a CPA conference and believes that southern Sudan should be given priority.

2.(C) Our meeting at the Arab League was perhaps the most positive meeting on Sudan in Cairo in recent memory. The visit of S/E Gration has energized the AL, and the AL hopes to work with the USG to help resolve the crises in Sudan. As such, the AL is willing to engage with Arab states and the regime in Khartoum to get them to support the U.S. proposals on Sudan. However, the AL will not be able to effectively engage with Darfur groups because they perceive that the League only supports the GOS and does not care about the Darfuri groups. The AL still believes that its Solution Package for Sudan is a way to bring justice without the ICC, although the GOS has not been keen to implement it. The AL view that JEM is a bigger part of the Sudan-Chad fighting than the intra-Darfuri conflict could provide a way to bring the Arabs and Fur to the negotiating table without the specter of JEM hovering over them. --------------------------------------------- ------ Arab League Supports USG on Sudan; Shares Priorities --------------------------------------------- ------

3.(C) Zeid Al Sabban, African Affairs Advisor to Arab League (AL) SYG Amre Moussa, told us on May 26 that the AL was pleased with the visit to Cairo of S/E Gration, and the AL supports the USG position on Sudan and has communicated this message to its member states (reftel A) He stated that AL priorities are first to get in ceasefire to bring peace to Darfur, second to bring about reconciliation between the rebel groups via a Darfur-Darfur dialogue and then with the GOS, and finally to make sure that justice is implemented under the AL Solution Package for Sudan (reftel B). ----------------------------- AL SYG Moussa's Visit to Sudan -----------------------------

4.(C) Al Sabban said that AL SYG Moussa, during his trip to Sudan on May 17-18, described the American position on Sudan as "very reasonable" and encouraged GOS VP Ali Osman Taha and Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin to "seize the opportunity" and work with the USG to resolve the crises in Sudan. Al Sabban told us that African Union (AU) Chairman Jean Ping and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) SYG Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who joined Moussa on his trip to Khartoum and El Fasher, all delivered the same message. Moussa, Ping, and Ihsanoglu visited the Abu Shouk IDP camp near El Fasher. In the camp, the three met with IDP leaders, women's advocates, and tribal leaders. According to Al Sabban, the camp's leaders spoke harshly against the GOS, stressed the need for security and peace, and said they supported the Doha process as a way to end the violence. Moussa told Taha and Salahuddin that the IDP camps were a "shame" for the GOS and Khartoum needs to do something to facilitate the return of the IDPs to their homes in cities and villages. Sabban said that UNAMID leaders in Al Fasher told the three leaders that the humanitarian situation was improving and the security situation was "ok." However, they feared that there was a "disaster on the horizon" if there CAIRO 00000958 002 OF 002 were no peace agreements. He said that all leaders in Darfur stressed the need for a Darfur-Darfur dialogue. ------------------------ Sudan-Chad Peace Process ------------------------

5.(C) Although there is still fighting between Sudan and Chad, Al Sabban praised U.S. efforts to negotiate a ceasefire because it provides the basis for a future agreement. He said that the Sudan-Chad issue remains a "dilemma" and the AL was willing to work with the USG on how to make the agreement, signed in Doha, "viable." He stated that it was important to have the JEM part of the Sudan-Chad process because Khalil Ibrahim and the JEM are primarily tied to Chad and only have the support of approximately 2 percent of the Darfuri population. Al Sabban stated that the AL and AU are ready to be more involved in the Doha process and he suggested that representatives from influential member states like Libya, Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria could play a constructive role in the regional peace process. The AL played a key role getting JEM to sign the Declaration of Intent in February 2009, and was encouraging JEM to become a "movement for peace." Al Sabban told us that the AL was willing to pressure JEM because it would be beneficial to get them to participate in Sudan-Chad peace talks.

6.(C) Al Sabban also stated that the one missing element to USG efforts in Sudan-Chad negotiations was the inclusion of the Chadian rebel groups. He said that these groups were "very similar to the JEM" and needed to be included in the process. He opined that the Chadian-Chadian talks would not be the "Pandora's box" of Sudanese-Sudanese talks. ---------------------- Darfur-Darfur Dialogue ----------------------

7.(C) Al Sabban said that other Darfuri groups beside the JEM need to be brought to the negotiating table and he advocated for the start of a Darfur-Darfur dialogue. He stated that the intra-Darfur conflict was primarily between the Arabs and Fur, and that the Zaghawa had "hijacked" the Darfur issue. Al Sabban said that Arab Darfuri and Fur leaders, both from the militias and IDP camps, need to sit down and have a dialogue. He said that without a solution to the Fur and Arab problem it will be impossible to maintain stability in Darfur. Al Sabban told us that the intra-Darfuri process eventually needs to be included in the large, overall peace process. ---------------------------- Support for a CPA Conference ----------------------------

8.(C) Al Sabban said that the AL likes the idea of convening a conference on the CPA in Washington because there is a need to "stabilize the country." He praised the idea of bringing higher-level, working diplomats, not ministers, to the conference because they are "not the big shots," but can do the work needed to facilitate the decision-making process. He stated that southern Sudan must be given priority in the next one and half years because the stability of the country is at risk and "no one wants to see another civil war." Al Sabban said that Arab companies were holding off on investing in South Sudan because they feared instability. SCOBEY