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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI243, JEM REPRESENTATIVE DISOUNTS TRIPOLI REBEL UNITY AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI243 2009-03-19 15:03 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO4027
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0243 0781519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 191519Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4641
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1441
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5168
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/18/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV LY SU
SUBJECT: JEM REPRESENTATIVE DISOUNTS TRIPOLI REBEL UNITY AGREEMENT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 372 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) According to Suliman Abdalla Ismail, the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement's/Khalil Ibrahim Faction (JEM/KI) Tripoli-based representative, the March 15 agreement signed in Tripoli between five Sudanese rebel groups and Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud may help mediators structure peace talks more efficiently, but will likely be ineffective due to the minor role the rebel groups play in Darfur and the impunity with which the Bashir government has acted since the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir. In a meeting with Poloff March 16, Ismail characterized the talks (reftel) as an attempt by Libya to reassert its role in Darfur mediation. Ismail was dismissive of the rebel groups represented, noting that "most of them only represent themselves and have no movement". SLA/Juba consisted of only a chairman, secretary general, and a military commander but lacked troops and civilian support, he said.

2.(C) Ismail conceded that it was important for the Government of Sudan (GOS) to engage with all rebel groups to reach cease-fire agreements and that consolidation would make that process more manageable. He downplayed, however, the potential for the "Unity Plus" coalition to engage in meaningful negotiation with the GOS since "there is not one SLA, there are 15 or 16 factions and no one has control," and the GOS was unwilling to negotiate due to the ICC prosecution of Bashir. He also warned that Egyptian and Libyan influence must be carefully monitored, saying "JEM invites discussions with neighbors to find peace. If they will only unify factions, this is okay. If they want another peace table, it will hurt negotiations".

3.(C) Commenting on JEM's relations with Libya, Ismail said contact with the GOL had become less frequent over the past six months. JEM/KI and SLA/Abdul Wahid were not invited to the March 15 meeting, a slight Ismail attributed to Libya's anger that JEM had sent a delegation to the U.S to discuss the Doha peace process and to lobby for sanctions against Khartoum and other measures - a no-fly zone, an "oil for food" sanction program, and a "free zone" for rebel talks. Ismail said that the US should show more support for the Doha process and be wary of Libyan intervention. "Look at what [Muammar al-Qadhafi] did in Mauritania".

4.(C) Comment: This was our first meeting with Ismail, who contacted the embassy through email addresses found on the embassy website. Seemingly well-informed, he dutifully "demarched" poloff on JEM talking points and was versed in Libya's Darfur activities. He was frank and openly critical of Libya's record in Darfur despite the watchful eyes of his Libyan minders a few tables away. End Comment. CRETZ