VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0446/01 0752040
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 162040Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1177
INFO RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4974
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0229
RUEAWJA/DOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS PHUM PE CI
SUBJECT: FUJIMORI EXTRADITION RULING MAY BE IMMINENT, 
TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
 
REF: 	A. 06 SANTIAGO 01061 
¶B. 06 SANTIAGO 01366 

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1.  (C) Summary:  At a dinner with FM Alejandro Foxley March on 16, Constitutional Tribunal President Jose Luis Cea told the Ambassador an initial ruling on Peru's extradition of former President Alberto Fujimori could come within the next two weeks.  Despite efforts by Foxley to draw Cea out on the ruling, Cea claimed not to know the actual outcome.  Although lawyers for Fujimore and for the GOP have both stated their intention to appeal the eventual ruling, the timing could not be less convenient for Chilean foreign policy -- Foxley is scheduled to be in Tokyo signing a free trade agreement on March 27.  Whatever the ruling, if it hits at the same time it is bound to detract from the signing.  Meanwhile, the Chilean press reports that Peruvian President Alan Garcia has faced domestic criticism for not pressing Peruvian territorial claims, and that some in his administration are talking about taking Peru's maritime border claim to the International Tribunal at The Hague.  As when the courts granted Fujimori liberty on bail in May 2006, just days before Peruvians went to the polls (ref A), a ruling at this time would demonstrate once more that the Chilean Supreme Court's docket is insensitive (if not hostile) to political courtesies.  End summary. 

FUJIMORI FACING EXTRADITION 	
--------------------------- 

¶2.  (SBU) Fujimori faces extradition to Peru after an immigration error allowed him to enter Chile, using a Peruvian passport bearing his Japanese name, in November 2005.  Detained by Chilean police the next day, Fujimori spent six months in jail until his release on bail, and under 	travel restrictions, in May 2006.  Peru formally requested extradition on corruption and human rights charges shortly 	after his arrest.  The Chilean Supreme Court judge in charge of the extradition hearings closed his investigation of the charges against Fujimori in January, calling on the parties to submit their final summations.  The GOP's lawyers presented their summation on February 6, Fujimori's defense on March 1.  With all arguments in hand, the presiding judge could issue a ruling in as little as 20 days -- that is March 30th.  That ruling, however, will be subject to appeal to the Second Criminal Court of the Santiago Supreme Court.  Both parties have already stated their intention to appeal an unfavorable ruling. 

A HICCUP WITH JAPAN 
------------------- 

¶3.  (C) Whatever the outcome of the imminent ruling or an eventual appeal, the domestic impact in Chile will be minimal.  While a handful of human rights activists are avidly following the case, the majority of Chileans are indifferent if not somewhat sympathetic to Fujimori (ref B). The real question is what impact will the ruling have on Chile's bilateral relations with Peru and Japan.  A preliminary ruling at this time would be somewhat inconvenient in the Chile - Japan relationship as it would distract attention from what is set to be a major achievement -- the signing of a free trade agreement on March 27. However, the Japanese Embassy in Santiago has taken a fairly 	low profile in the case (Fujimori is a dual Peruvian -Japanese citizen).  Fujimori recently moved to a small apartment close to the Japanese Ambassador's house and the Japanese embassy, raising fears he might attempt to claim asylum and return to Japan.  Chilean police have Fujimori under 24-hour surveillance, and GOC officials claim to have taken steps to prevent this eventuality.  Fujimori's extradition to Peru, which has guaranteed his right to a free trial, should not create friction in the official 	relationship between Chile and Japan. 

BUT A BELLY RUMBLE FOR PERU 
--------------------------- 

¶4.  (C) The effect on the Peru - Chile relationship is more fraught with peril and harder to gauge.  A decision to extradite could tend to solidify relations between Bachelet and Garcia, possibly strenthening Garcia's hand and ability to push forward with commercial and military cooperation with Chile.  Some in Chile fear a decision against extradition could weaken Garcia domestically, strengthening rumors of some kind of back-room deal between Garcia and the Fujimoristas, or providing ammunition to HumalaOllanta. 

¶5.  (C) When under threat, Peruvian leaders in the past have often resorted to taking a hard line against Chile to bolster 	their own nationalist and populist credentials, but provoking diplomatic backlash from Chile.  The GOC has worked assiduously to support Garcia and maintain good relations with his government.  Last week Foxley convinced the directorate of Chile's National Television (TVN) to delay broadcast of a documentary on the 1897 War of the Pacific between Chile, Peru and Bolivia.  Chilean and Peruvian diplomats feared the broadcast (besides Chile, TVN is seen by over 600,000 viewers in southern Peru) could fan a nationalist backlash in advance of important multilateral and bilateral meetings. 

A MATTER OF TIMING 
------------------ 

¶6.  (C) If the ruling comes early, once again Chile's Supreme Court will be showing its insensitivity to the effect of the Fujimori case on international relations.  Between Foxley's planned FTA signing in Japan and Bachelet's planned side meeting with Garcia at the South America Energy Integration Summit on April 17, the timing of any ruling -- positive or negative -- couldn't be worse.  Although both Garcia and Bachelet want to see an improvement in the bilateral relationship, Gacia's internal opposition and even members of his own party seemed fixated on keeping Peru's maritime and land border aspirations on the front burner.  Post would welcome the views of our colleagues in Peru and Japan on possible ramifications of an early decision. 

KELLY