VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #5805/01 1791718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281718Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6439
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6939
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7899
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3970
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9301
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4618
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3597
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005805 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA EXPRESSES CONCERNS ABOUT GOC-AUC PEACE 
PROCESS 


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 

¶1.  (C) Sergio Caramagna, Director of the Mission to Support 
the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), told the Ambassador 
on 23 June that nothing had united AUC leaders more than the 
Constitutional Court's mid-May press release that previewed 
the Court's views on the Justice and Peace Law.  Caramagna
said Minister of Interior and Justice SabasPretelt said in a 
recent meeting with AUC leaders that the GOC would seek to 
preserve the "core principles" of the Justice and Peace Law 
in the event of an "adverse" Court ruling.  Caramagna warned 
AUC leaders were concerned that over 200 middle ranking 
demobilized paramilitaries were "waiting for the process to 
fail."  Moreover, paramilitaries were watching closely for 
any additional benefits the GOC is willing to offer to the 
ELN and the FARC, in the expectation they would benefit from 
the same terms.  End summary. 

--------------------------------------------- -- 
GOC ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE AUC LEADERS' CONCERNS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

¶2.  (C) Caramagna told the Ambassador he was surprised that 
all the AUC leaders and their legal advisers, including 
paramilitary leader "Aleman" who had negotiated separately 
from the other AUC leaders, had attended a meeting with the 
GOC on June 17 (see septel for a read out of a follow up 
meeting AUC leaders had with the National Reconciliation and 
Reparations Commission).  Nothing had united AUC leaders more 
than the Constitutional Court's mid-May press release that 
previewed the Court's views on the Justice and Peace Law. 
Caramagna said it was irresponsible for the Court to make 
public its preliminary observations on the law, since it hit 
on several sensitive subjects.  Caramagna insisted, however, 
that no official accords were made between the GOC and AUC 
leaders on such things as prison terms, reparations, and 
political status. 

¶3.  (C) Caramagna said Peace Commissioner Restrepo never said 
a word during the seven-hour meeting, instead acting as if he 
were a subordinate to Pretelt.  The relationship between 
Restrepo and Preteltwas progressively getting worse. 
According to Carmagna, Pretelt blamed Restrepo for inundating 
the system with over 12,000 more demobilized paramilitaries 
than the GOC had originally estimated, and Restrepo blamed 
Pretelt for making promises to the paramilitaries that the 
GOC could not deliver. 

¶4.  (C) Caramagna said Pretelt defended the core principles 
of the J&P Law, saying the GOC would seek to preserve them in 
the event of an "adverse" Court ruling.  On extradition, 
Pretelt insisted that demobilized paramilitaries must abide 
completely by the principles of the J&P Law to avoid 
extradition.  According to Caramagna, it is unclear if the 
AUC leaders left satisfied with Pretelt's assurances, "but at 
least they did not leave the negotiating table." 

¶5.  (C) Caramagna said the AUC's military structure has been 
dismantled.  This was confirmed by several AUC leaders, who 
privately told Caramagna their men no longer report or even 
respond to them.  Caramagna said that Vicente Castano was 
concerned that over 200 middle ranking demobilized 
paramilitaries were "waiting for the process to fail." 
Castano warned that these individuals are threatening to 
attack the State and return to kidnapping to achieve 
political recognition from the government.  Castano, however, 
said this could still be prevented. 

----------------------------------------- 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF ELN TROUBLESOME 
----------------------------------------- 

¶6.  (C) According to Caramagna, paramilitaries are watching 
closely for any additional benefits the GOC is willing to 
offer to the ELN and the FARC, in the expectation they would 
also benefit from the more generous peace terms.  Any such 
benefits could endanger the paramilitary peace process.  He 
described President Uribe's comment in May that the GOC would 
consider another judicial framework with the ELN as a "bomb" 
to theta4D$Q