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Viewing cable 06LIMA158, LIMA MAYOR LUIS CASTANEDA ON OLLANTA HUMALA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA158 | 2006-01-13 14:02 | 2011-02-20 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: http://elcomercio.pe/ |
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #0158/01 0131419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131419Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8087
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2842
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8909
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN QUITO 9916
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0070
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6437
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000158
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: LIMA MAYOR LUIS CASTANEDA ON OLLANTA HUMALA
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(b/
d).
...
id: 49732
date: 1/13/2006 14:19
refid: 06LIMA158
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #0158/01 0131419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131419Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8087
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2842
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8909
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN QUITO 9916
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0070
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6437
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000158
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: LIMA MAYOR LUIS CASTANEDA ON OLLANTA HUMALA
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(b/
d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lima Mayor Luis Castaneda, in a 1/10
meeting with the Ambassador and Polcouns, characterized
Ollanta Humala's appeal to Peru's marginalized voters as one
of "sentiment," not reasoning. He cautioned that frontal
attacks on Humala will backfire and mused that the best way
to undercut the latter would be by shining a light on him,
his positions, and his congressional candidates. Castaneda,
who is Peru's most popular politician, said that he would
personally get involved in the campaign "at an opportune
moment," which would probably come sometime between the first
and second rounds of presidential balloting. His National
Solidarity party is a member of Lourdes Flores' Unidad
Nacional alliance, and will be running a slate of
congressional candidates under its banner, most of whom have
worked with Castaneda before. He predicted that the
presidential race will come down to Flores and Humala, with
Flores coming out on top. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Castaneda assessed Ollanta Humala's appeal as
follows:
-- The Peruvian electorate can be divided into two sectors:
the conventional sector, which will vote for traditional
politicians such as Lourdes Flores, Valentin Paniagua and
Alan Garcia, and the non-conventional sector, which will vote
for anti-system candidates such as Alberto Fujimori or Humala.
-- The non-conventional sector has been growing because the
traditional politicians and the three branches of government
are increasingly discredited. The people are fed up with the
old figures, they see no light at the end of the tunnel, and
the polls show that most would leave the country if they
could.
-- The non-conventional sector's vote is one of rejection,
it is not a positive action. Support for Ollanta Humala is
based on this "sentiment" of rejection, not on any of
Humala's particular qualities. The non-conventional
candidate could be Humala, or it could be any John Doe, just
so long as his campaign is aimed at obtaining vengeance on
the corrupt elite.
-- The less Humala says the more he will benefit from this
sentiment: "If I was his advisor I'd tell him to keep his
mouth shut."
-- The population also senses a lack of leadership, and
Humala appeals to the desire for a strong figure in charge.
¶3. (C) The traditional politicians, Castaneda acknowledged,
are largely to blame for this situation, as they have battled
over the spoils of power rather than dedicate themselves to
improving the lot of Peru's poorest. He contrasted this to
his own actions as Mayor, in which he has sought to employ
the Lima Municipality's meager resources in the most
efficient manner possible to bring about positive tangible
improvements in people's lives, pointing in particular to his
program of building over 1000 staircases in the shantytowns
clinging to the hillsides surrounding the capital (Note:
Castaneda's approval rating currently is about 80%. End
Note). Castaneda also faulted the media for helping to
destroy people's faith in the country and demoralizing
society as a whole, noting that it refuses to provide
adequate coverage to positive developments while accentuating
the negatives. He dismissed most media organs and
journalists as little more than blackmail artists, dredging
up scandals in order to extort money from those involved,
rather than to promote needed reforms.
¶4. (C) The best way to counter Humala, Castaneda opined,
would be by forcing him and his followers into the light of
publicity. The more people become aware of who Humala, his
vice presidential and his congressional running mates really
are, the Lima Mayor explained, the more it will weaken the
power of the "sentiment" that has brought him up in the polls
and, "the more the people will realize that he is not the
dream they thought he was." Another useful tactic, Castaneda
suggested, would be to create confusion regarding the four
Humalas currently involved in politics: Ollanta, his brother
Ulises (running as a rival presidential hopeful on the Avanza
Pais ticket), his imprisoned brother Antauro (charged with
responsibility for the death of five people in the January
2005 Andahuaylas uprising) and his father Isaac (most
recently talking favorably about the possibility of war with
Chile).
¶5. (C) The worst way to counter Humala, Castaneda
continued, would be to attack him frontally. If the
traditional politicians try this, he declared, it would just
play into Humala's hands as his potential electorate is
naturally inclined to believe the opposite of what the
traditional pols say. The media is equally discredited, and
has far less influence than it is thought to have. Castaneda
pointed out that he was elected Mayor despite having the
media against his candidacy. "The way to communicate with
the people," he emphasized, "is not through words," but
through personal contact and deeds.
¶6. (C) When asked by the Ambassador for his predictions on
the outcome of the election, Castaneda replied that he
thought it would come down to a run-off between Lourdes
Flores (to whose Unidad Nacional alliance he belongs) and
Humala, with Flores emerging victorious. He dismissed the
possibility that APRA's Alan Garcia would win through to the
second round, calling him a "snake oil salesman with a tired
message whose day has passed." Castaneda cautioned, however,
that he suspected that his opinion may have been influenced
more by his heart than his head.
¶7. (C) With respect to his own involvement in the electoral
process, Castaneda said that he would intervene, "at the
opportune moment." He was not sure precisely when this
moment would come, but stated that it would probably be
sometime between the first and second round of presidential
balloting. A politician has to safeguard his influence and
credibility, the Mayor explained, and he would be very
careful in deciding when to play his political chits.
¶8. (C) Castaneda added that his National Solidarity party
has largely finalized its congressional candidates that will
run under the Unidad Nacional alliance. Most have worked
with the Mayor before, either for the municipality or for the
Social Security Administration, which Castaneda previously
headed. Almost all of these candidates have never served in
Congress before, he noted, the exceptions being holdovers in
Lambayeque and Piura (a reference to current Unidad Nacional
legislators Rafael Aita and Fabiola Morales).
¶9. (C) COMMENT: Castaneda is by far and away Peru's most
popular politician, an honor he has earned through hard work,
apparently honest government, and an ability to communicate
with the poorest classes, understanding their needs and
responding effectively to them. As he himself noted, "I am
much more popular in the E sector (Peru's least well off)
than Ollanta." His National Solidarity party has built up a
strong party organization in the shanty towns around Lima,
which enables him to keep his finger on the socio-political
pulse. His views on the basis for Humala's popularity, and
on the ways to undermine it, are worth paying attention to.
END COMMENT.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================